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Abstract: Science and emerging technologies should not be predominantly tasked 
with furnishing us with more sustainable societies. Continuous short-term 
technological bail outs without taking into account the longer socio-cultural 
incubation times required to transition to ‘weakly sustainable’ economies squander 
valuable resources and time. Emerging technologies need to be deployed 
strategically to buy time in order to have extended political, social and ethical 
discussions about the root-causes of unsustainable economies and minimize social 
disruptions on the path towards global sustainability. 
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Introduction 
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, economic growth has been 
continuously challenged by a series of energy and resource crises. Such crises have 
been mitigated by technological innovations that subsequently led to a supply-side shift, 
prompting further growth of our energy needs. Many of these technological 
innovations are the result of scientific and engineering revolutions (e.g. the steam 
engine, microelectronics, the internal combustion engine, biotechnology) which have 
dramatically changed our working, political, cultural, ecological and living 
environments. The emergence of global issues and challenges in the past decades as 
well as the concomitant realization of global commons and finite resource limits has 
focused our attention on sustainability. During its rapid initial development capitalism 
largely ignored concerns about sustainability. However, in the last 40 years or so we 
started to acknowledge the existence of certain strategic global resources and 
ecological limits. However, at the same time we continue to insist on the prospect that 
technological efficiencies spurred on by shorter and shorter research and innovation 
cycles will allow us to grow our economies, increase our personal and global wealth, 
and increase global population while at the same time minimizing environmental 
impacts as well as social and economic inequalities. The early discussions and 
questioning of economic growth as a conditio sine qua non triggered by the publication 
of ‘The Limits to Growth’ in 1972 subsided for nearly a quarter of a century, but 
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references to it have recently re-emerged as a consequence of discussions on global 
climate change and global environmental pressures such as deforestation, loss of 
biodiversity and concerns regarding ecological, economical and societal sustainability 
(Meadows et al. 1972). New arguments as well as critical re-evaluations of ‘The Limits 
to Growth’ are now much more sympathetic. Many of the original predictions have 
turned out to describe characteristics qualitatively in agreement with currently observed 
trends in bio- and geophysical metrics (e.g. land and global freshwater use, pollution, 
reduction in biodiversity) (Tuner 2008; Rockstrom et al. 2009). Existing and emerging 
technologies such as nano- and green technologies will in the short term continue to 
spur economic growth and provide opportunities to advance solutions to some of the 
world’s intractable global problems, such as the existence of eternal ‘poverty traps’ in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Sachs 2008), limited water resources and extended draughts, local 
and global agricultural crises, global climate change and the constant threat of world-
wide pandemics. I will use simple macroeconomic concepts to argue in this paper that 
(1) science and technology should not be predominantly tasked with building a path 
towards sustainable societies and (2) that in the long term, global policies must 
acknowledge and accept global resource and economic growth limits and redirect 
money gained from ever increasing technological efficiencies to develop strategies and 
global political frameworks to meet weak sustainability standards. The longer science 
and emerging technologies continue to be predominantly burdened with achieving 
increasingly ambitious goals, the shorter the time span will be to transition our societies 
from a growth to a sustainable mode without encountering major social disruptions. 
Additionally, we will then have to rely progressively more on serendipitous 
technological ‘aces up our sleeves’, calling upon historical precedents and selective 
past successes of transformational technological achievements to avert consecutive 
resource and supply crises. The time available for the development and implementation 
of technologies is key to being able to confront global challenges such as climate 
change, long term environmental sustainability and the eradication of poverty in the 
poorest regions of the world. These crises also require significant socio-cultural 
incubation times which we are squandering by predominantly relying on science and 
emerging technologies to continuously bail us out in the short term. These 
technological bail outs, however, might even shorten the time span until the next 
resource or implementation crisis appears and subsequently call for even more 
challenging technological feats. We risk being caught in a prolonged series of resource 
crises with respect to specific strategic materials such as rare earth elements, Helium-3 
and Lithium that will further paralyze and derail the long-term technological 
implementation of mature technologies with low environmental impact. Science cannot 
continuously and at an accelerating pace produce ‘transformational’ answers to more 
and more complex problems. By speeding up this resource crisis-technology spiral, we 
will at the same time curtail valuable time needed for cultural, moral and political 
change required to implement economies which can adhere to principles of weak 
sustainability. Nanotechnologies and other emerging technologies need to be deployed 
strategically so as to buy us time to gradually allow us to transition into sustainable 
economies and thereby minimize inevitable inequities during this process. 
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Nanoscience – A Different Science 
Nanotechnologies (in particular those that address energy-related technologies, such as 
catalysis, fuel cells, batteries, and solar cells) have been enlisted to “unveil a realm of 
functional materials for fueling the challenge of low-carbon, sustainable energy” 
(Schoegl 2008, p. 772). In a commentary Schloegl argues that “…there remains an 
enormous need for fundamental research into understanding nanoscale effects and 
hence realizing the rational design of materials for energy applications” (Schoegl 2008, 
p. 772). In such claims and projections nanoscience and technology are always tethered, 
emphasizing that the quest to discover and design specific and technologically 
applicable functionalities of materials and devices is at the core of nanoscience. This 
claim, made by scientists and politicians, is similarly promoted by governmental and 
private funding agencies as well as companies, all of whom display a considerable 
amount of optimism that appropriate technologies can and will be developed to meet 
these very high expectations. In many cases this optimism lacks any professional 
modesty and realism, and represents a rhetorical overselling of technologies which 
raises expectations to naive levels. The traditional academic Mertonian ideal of the 
disinterested scientist enlarging public knowledge has been in part superseded in most 
research institutions by a partisan and authoritarian expert concerned with protecting 
private or public intellectual property rights (Merton 1942). The value of public 
intellectual property has morphed from benefiting the public at large to advancing and 
supplementing the financial needs of universities and/or governmental laboratories1. 
The aforementioned focus on the applicability of nanoscience is not relegated to a later 
phase in the knowledge production chain, but is present in the very early stages of basic 
research. We have previously argued that nanoscience represents the first full 
embodiment of a post-academic or mode-2 science, which coexists with mode-1 
practices at academic, industrial and governmental institutions (Vogt et al. 2007). 
Besides the dispassionate behavior of scientists being partially displaced by 
authoritarian managerial authority, Ziman adds as a further example of the mode-1 to 
mode-2 transition changes in the notion of originality relating to individual 
investigators’ choices of the problems they decide to take on (Ziman 2000). Within the 
context of the ‘linear model’ of science and technology progression – put forward by 
Vannevar Bush – a ‘random walk’ approach to problem-choice was justified by 
arguments mainly based on historical precedence, which in many cases elevated 
serendipity to a convenient myth (Bush 1945). Recently the formulation of ‘Grand 
Challenges’ and a broad push for mission-oriented research and technology 
development reveal a significant shift from individual research to the collective action 
of multidisciplinary teams. This (at least partial) change of the operational philosophy 
of the US Department of Energy (DOE) corroborates the thesis that nanoscience 
represents a different way to do science.  
In a recent DOE Basic Energy Sciences Division document, a transformation 
‘from observational to control science’ is suggested: a contrast is set up between the 
20th century’s observational tools (electron microscopes, scanning tunneling 
microscopes) and materials discovery with the emergence of notions of directing matter 
                                                           
1 The currently observed ‘forced privatization’ of public universities in the US by many state 
governments who are abandoning their fiscal responsibilities regarding higher education while insisting 
on continued governance and imposition of inefficient regulatory rules will only accelerate ‘mission 
creep’ and increase the pressure on commercialization to provide alternative streams of revenue. 
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and energy through exploring chemical changes, charge, spin and light interactions in 
materials design (Basic Energy Sciences Advisory Committee 2007). What is 
emphasized and called for is directed ‘bottom-up’ self-assembly of materials, ‘top-
down’ fabrication at the nanoscale, and theory, modeling and simulation being used to 
guide materials design2. The latter concept had already surfaced in traditional materials 
science and chemistry as the concept of ‘rational design’. However, in nanoscience the 
challenge of how to pursue rational materials design becomes center stage with an 
enormous expansion of the materials design space, enabling the design of new 
materials with new or significantly improved functionalities. The size and shape of 
materials becomes relevant due to the emergence of unique and new functionalities at 
the nanoscale between 1 and 100nm. The size- and shape-dependence of particles of 
matter alters physical (e.g. melting point, color) and chemical (e.g. reactivity) 
properties, allowing us to escape the two dimensional functional periodicity underlying 
the periodic table of chemical elements and thereby significantly enlarging our material 
design space 3 . Traditional investigations into structure-composition-property 
relationships no longer suffice at the nanoscale, and need to be expanded to probe 
structure-composition-size/shape-property relationships. We know the structures of all 
hundred or so chemical elements of the periodic table that are relevant as material 
building blocks. Adding on size-dependent functionalities in the nanoscale expands our 
parameter space for materials design substantially. For example, gold is chemically 
inert and nonmagnetic at the macroscale but becomes highly reactive and magnetic at 
the nanoscale. 
The Rational Exuberance of Nanoscience and Dematerialization 
Using chemical knowledge and an approximate combinatorial approach to estimate the 
number of distinct materials composed of different chemical elements (A,B,C,D…), we 
anticipate about 4.950 different binary compounds AxBy (such as NaCl and H2O) 
(Rodgers and Cebon 2006, p. 976). Chemists and materials scientists have made and 
partially investigated the structures and properties of about 80% of these materials. In 
the cases of materials composed of three elements (ternary compounds, AxByCz, such 
as BaTiO3 or CaCO3), we have made and characterized only about 5% of over 160,000 
possible compounds. Of the approximately 3,9 million potential materials composed of 
four elements (quartenary compounds, AxByCzDw) we have explored less than 1% of 
the possible compositions (stoichiometries). Quartenary compounds contain important 
                                                           
2 Materials design space: The entire set of parameters (i.e. atoms, chemical compositions, structures) 
which determine the functionalities of a chemical compound or composite. 
3 The expansion of this concept to a ‘multi-dimensional periodic table of the elements’ is an appealing 
one as it allows the use of economic parameters such as price (which scales to a first approximation 
with the relative abundance of a chemical element in the earth’s upper continental crust), ecological 
parameters such as toxicity and non-degradability, manufacturing and recycling costs and even political 
factors such as for example the need to minimize the amount of tantalum used in consumer electronics 
due to the fact that the mining of  Tantalum and Niobium is fueling conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa to 
be taken into account when looking at elemental compositions of prospective new materials and devices. 
Such an upstream analysis and the imposition of non-scientific constraints on the materials availability 
for photovoltaic devices reveals that iron pyrite (FeS2) is a very attractive material with respect to cost 
and availability and that some of the currently leading technologies such as those based on CdTe will 
not be able to meet the quantities needed to be scaled up globally (see Wadia et al. 2009). 
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materials such as heterogeneous catalysts, high-temperature superconductors (e.g. 
YBa2Cu3O7-!) and dielectric materials used for telecommunication (e.g. Pb1-xZrxTiO3, 
CaCu3Ti4O12). In organic chemistry alone it was recently estimated that the total 
number of molecules even with the relatively small molecular weight of 160 Daltons is 
about 13,9 million (Fink et al. 2005). 
In our quest for the exploration of distinct chemical compounds with particular 
physical (e.g. electrical, magnetic, optical) and chemical (e.g. reactivity and stability) 
properties we have thus barely scratched the surface within ‘conventional’ materials 
science, let alone in nanoscience, in which – besides the composition and structure of a 
material – we can now vary the size and shape of the particles to create unique 
properties. While the manner in which a particular functionality will change with size 
and shape at the nanoscale depends strongly on the element and chemical compound, 
we will be able to radically expand our materials design space for the synthesis and 
design of new materials and their associated functionalities by adding size and shape to 
our materials engineering toolbox. This creates a ‘rational exuberance’ for a quest to 
optimize and create new materials and properties. This transformative potential of 
nanoscience is constantly being called upon. An article in Physics Today addressing the 
3He resource crisis is a representative illustration of the expectations raised by 
nanoscience: “And for the longer term, the hope is that nanotechnology will provide 
solutions” (Feder 2009, p 22). 
However, the sheer size of this expanded materials design space challenges and 
ultimately renders impossible so-called ‘Edisonian’ and other traditional approaches to 
experimentally explore, sequentially and individually, the functionalities of all of these 
possible elemental combinations. The opportunities that nanoscience offers for the 
exploration of new materials and properties have, as a consequence, a trade off in 
inevitably calling for a screening process that relies heavily on ‘in-silico-experiments’; 
namely the use of theory, modeling and simulation (TM&S) to tease out prospective 
‘hints and hits’ from millions of candidate compounds4. TM&S at the nanoscale has 
received much attention and is being promoted as an ‘alternative experimental tool’ 
with which to explore novel functionalities in nanoscale structured materials. One 
example of such game-changing expectations is nanoscience research efforts in 
heterogeneous catalysis, which have raised expectations that (1) science will be able to 
mimic the catalytic reactivities and selectivities of expensive and rare noble metals 
such as gold, platinum or rhodium by combining cheaper elements at the nanoscale 
(LeGoff et al. 2009), and (2) it will become possible to deposit only a very thin layer of 
required noble metals on a cheap substrate.  
The latter research efforts bring up a second game-changing claim that 
nanoscience has nurtured and revived; namely, the prospect of dematerialization, in 
which by using highly optimized composites (e.g. Pt coatings on Al2O3 substrates) one 
is able to do more with less material. Dematerialization, broadly defined as the decline 
over time of the quantitative usage of materials in industrial and consumer products, 
has been suggested as the hallmark of advanced economies in which material needs are 
largely satisfied (cf. Herman et al. 1990). Frequently cited examples include nuclear 
                                                           
4 This approach brings up the interesting question of what we miss at the nanoscale using such high-
throughput screening processes which by their nature will use a ‘fingerprint’ that might be very weak 
and/or masked or even miss a ‘hit’ completely by a too coarse step used in varying the stochiometric 
coefficients i.e. xyz in AxByCz. Could the publishing of such screening processes prevent a scientist 
from re-investigating these now chartered territories in materials parameter space? 
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fuels such as uranium, where one kilogram can produce the same amount of energy as 
13 tons of oil or 19 tons of coal, or telecommunications hardware, where 25 kilogram 
of fiberglass wire replaces about 1 ton of copper and is produced using only 5% of the 
energy.  
Dematerialization is being put forward as the solution to being able to have 
continued economic growth as well as increasing the affluence (A) of the global 
population (P), without this necessarily triggering a commensurate negative 
environmental impact (Im). Commoner (1972) and Ehrlich and Holdren (1972) 
introduced a macroeconomic dimensionless ‘ImPAT’ measure relating population size 
(P), affluence (A) and technology efficiency (T) to impact (Im). Waggoner and 
Ausubel (2002) recently expanded ImPAT to what they called the macroeconomic 
ImPACT identity, where the environmental impact (Im) in units of emissions is the 
product of 4 parameters: population P in capita, affluence A in units of GDP/capita, 
consumer intensity of use C in units of energy/GDP, and the efficiency T of 
technologies in units of emissions/energy: 
Im[emissions] = P[capita] x A[GDP/capita] x C[energy/GDP] x 
T[emissions/energy]. 
Environmental impact Im implies emitting something into the environment in the 
broadest sense of the meaning. Affluence A in units of GDP/capita can be called 
income. The consumer’s intensity of use C in energy/GDP quantifies how much of the 
income will be used to impact the environment. Thus one form of dematerialization is 
achieved by reducing the consumer’s intensity of use C. This consumer driven 
dematerialization is distinct from the technology efficiency factor T, which measures 
the ratio of environmental impact to goods demanded and manufactured. Thus an 
advanced and more efficient technology minimizes this factor by reducing the ratio of 
goods/environmental impact. 
Reducing and/or maintaining environmental impacts, which have both global and 
local consequences, can be achieved by tackling different factors: P is essentially 
dependent on the total fertility factor and life expectancies driven by disease, war, 
conflicts, imposed family planning restrictions such as those practiced in China, or the 
increase of affluence and education which reduces birth rates in developed societies. 
The latter indicates that the four parameters P,A,C and T are not independent. 
Affluence depends on the speed of innovation and efficiency of manufacturing and can 
be influenced by work force quality, efficiency of bureaucracies and various 
institutional practices (e.g. corruption, incentives). Binary products such as P x A 
[GDP] represent the challenge of sustainability, whose impact one might be able to 
offset by using the sustainability levers C x T [emissions/GDP], challenging both 
consumers and technologists to reduce the environmental impact. Reducing C is 
referred to as dematerialization; reducing T is called increasing the technological 
efficiency which is in many cases achieved, as outlined above, by dematerialization. 
A simple but important conclusion which will be relevant in a latter section of this 
paper is that the more factors involved in reducing Im, the less disruptive individual 
reductions and/or constraints will be for the various actors involved (families, 
workforce, consumers and producers). To be successful, this shared but distributed 
burden will require coordination and trade-offs amongst all the actors involved. The 
nature of this highly political process reveals that forging the path towards sustainable 
economies by using predominantly scientific and technological progress is a flawed 
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strategy. Both sustainability levers C and T need to be employed to reduce 
environmental impacts, and declaring the sustainability challengers P and A off limits 
to reductions severely limits the response tools available and might need to be 
challenged in the long run. A reduction of the consumer’s intensity of use C can 
concomitantly free up technological efficiencies which can then be used further to 
reduce environmental impact. Price policies, market incentives and other governmental 
regulatory policies as well as cultural and behavioral changes can, in the long run, be 
envisioned to initiate this type of behavior and thereby relieve the pressures on 
technological innovation and implementation so as to reduce the environmental 
footprint. This early coordination and integration of policies and research to address 
local and global crises are again cultural hallmarks of mode-2 science, and will become 
important attributes in our attempts to navigate our societies towards more sustainable 
economies.  
Technological and Behavioral Wedges 
An important tool in addressing how to practically implement significant reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions was put forward by Pacala and Socolow (2004). A triangular 
area of emissions (the ‘stabilization triangle’) with a total area of 175 Giga tons (Gt) of 
carbon emitted between 2004 and 2054 will need to be avoided in order to stabilize 
CO2 emissions at 7 Gt of carbon per year. This triangle is divided into seven ‘wedges’ 
allowing the examination of efficacy of technologies employed to stabilize CO2 
concentrations at 500ppm (Figure 1). Under the assumption of linear growth of fossil 
fuel emissions, the emission reductions by implementing low carbon emission 
technologies per wedge are 25 GtC, and the total area of the stabilization triangle is 175 
fuel emissions, the emission reductions by implementing low carbon emission techno 
 
 
Figure 1: Seven stabilization wedges of an energy portfolio to reduce fossil fuel emissions by employing 
various technological solutions (taken from Pacala and Socolow 2004, p. 969) 
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logies per wedge are 25 GtC, and the total area of the stabilization triangle is 175 GtC. 
The list of potential technology wedges based on currently available technologies 
includes the use of more efficient vehicles, increasing the efficiency of buildings, the 
use of wind power and nuclear power, biomass power and others (see Waggoner and 
Ausubel (2002) for details). 
In an intriguing recent study Dietz and his group propose the implementation of a 
behavioral wedge which could “….potentially help and avoid an ‘overshoot’ of 
Greenhouse gas concentration targets; provide a demonstration effect; reduce emissions 
at lower costs; and buy time to develop new technologies, policies, and institutions to 
reach long-term greenhouse gas emission targets and to develop adoption strategies. 
Household emissions represent ~38% of overall CO2 emissions in the US in 2005” 
(Dietz et al. 2009, p. 18452) By focusing on US households and targeting 
weatherization, maintenance and adoption of energy-efficient appliances and a number 
of low-barrier behavioral changes such as reducing operating temperatures of devices 
(i.e. dryers, water heaters) and eliminating stand-by electricity, nearly 20% of 
household direct emissions – or 7,4% of US national emissions – can be eliminated.  
Such a behavioral wedge could reduce the scientific and technological challenges 
technologies face in the remaining technology wedges and possibly transform some of 
the required progress from being transformative to incremental. This will lower the risk 
of failure of individual technological wedges and increase the probability of meeting 
the overall goal of stabilizing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere at 500ppm. 
Weak Sustainability and Permanent Resource Crises. 
While at least in the short- to mid-term dematerialization has been shown to provide a 
path towards sustainability, the decline of consumption per GDP and lower intensity 
production of goods will ultimately level off and we will approach a series of recurring 
sustainability limits and crises. Even if some radically transformational technology 
goals could be cost-effectively implemented (e.g. nuclear fusion, hydrogen economies 
fueled by solar energy), the long term use of dematerialization strategies – in which 
more will continuously be produced from less, and sustainability will be achieved on 
the basis of sustained dematerialization through the persistent flow of transformational 
new technologies – is most likely to be elusive. While we will be able to transform 
certain processes in our currently ‘linear economies’ running on non-renewable fossil 
fuels (and other non-renewable strategic materials) into ones in partially ‘closed 
economies’, in which raw materials and products are converted into each other by 
manufacturing and subsequently recycling to reduce environmental impacts, we will 
not be able to achieve sustainable economies in the strong sense (as put forward by 
Constanza and Daly 1992) without drastic population reduction (-P) and austere 
consumer behavior (-A). Strong sustainability mandates that natural capital stocks are 
to be kept constant. This is in contrast to weak sustainability, in which natural capital 
stocks can be replaced by human-made capital, and only the aggregate needs to stay 
constant (as put forward by Rees and Wackernagel 1995). Reijnders (1998) states that 
‘dematerialization’ of the economy by a factor of ~10 indicates ‘remarkable 
technological optimism’. It took 25 years (1959-1984) to reduce the energy intensity 
(energy use/unit of GDP) of the US economy by 50% (Graedel and Allenby 1995). 
Again, the time spans needed for such increases in technological efficiency are decades 
and require sustained political and technological efforts if they are to come to fruition. 
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However, even economies based on weak sustainability will be continuously 
confronted with (1) permanent resource crises due to the limited availability of 
strategic materials (i.e. rare earths, lithium); and (2) the fact that complete and cost-
effective recycling will not be possible.   
The amount and types of materials needed to implement low- or zero carbon based 
technologies for a weakly sustainable economy already point to the beginning of a 
series of resource crisis (‘permanent resource crises’). The rare earth metals have 
abundances on the order of parts-per-million in the earth’s crust. While the elements of 
this group of 15 metals are not as rare as their name indicates, their 2007 world demand 
of 110,000 tons, of which 90% comes from China, is used in many high-tech products 
and processes, including ceramics and pigments (7%), catalysis, including automotive 
catalytic converters (20%), phosphors for compact fluorescent and solid state lighting 
(LEDs) (7%), the glass and polishing industry (25%), permanent magnets such as Nd-
Fe-B and SmCo5 (35%) and other applications such as the newly identified need for 
neodymium (Nd) for wind turbine systems and as unrefined mixtures called 
‘mischmetal’ in nickel hydride batteries (6%) (Cuif 2008). Many of these uses are 
center stage in green technologies and their demand is likely to outpace supply within a 
very short time. The price of rare earth metals has been going up in the last decade, due 
to the limited supply (controlled by the Chinese government) and the growing demand 
for phosphors for lighting applications. The anticipated ban of incandescent lamps in 
Australia and Europe, and the push for compact fluorescent lamps in the short term has 
already put enormous pressure on rare earth supplies and prices. A full ‘green lighting 
switch’ will double the required volume of phosphors containing rare earth metals. We 
also anticipate a continued demand for flat plate TV screens: a continuous growth rate 
of 15-20% for large size flat displays is projected over the next few years. There is 
already a shortage of Terbium (Tb), needed for green phosphors, and Europium (Eu), 
used for red and blue phosphors. At most about 40% of additional Tb (~50 tons) and 
75% of Eu (~130 tons) will be available by 2015. Recycling 10-15% of the current 
world supply of Tb and Eu is an absolute must for addressing this materials shortage in 
the short to mid-term – but there is currently no agreed upon process for efficiently 
collecting and recycling rare earth metals from lighting phosphors. 
Other strategic materials needed to implement green and nanotechnologies which 
are currently resource limited are silver, tellurium and indium (for thin film 
photovoltaic devices), platinum (needed for fuel cells), and lithium (for lithium based 
batteries). The global lithium production in 2005 was about 20.000 tons, and came 
from two main sources: (i) an Li,Al silicate, the mineral spodumene (18%) and (ii) 
LiCl extracted from brine lakes and salt planes. 50% of the 2005 global production 
came from Chile and Argentine; 75% of global reserves are located in South America, 
with the largest reserves (~50%) currently lying untapped in the Salar di Uyuni salt 
lakes in Bolivia. Political tensions regarding Li mining are already manifest in both 
Chile and Argentine, with major flashpoints being the enormous water use required for 
the LiCl extraction, as well as ecological and environmental concerns and issues about 
the rights and economic benefits of local communities. Bolivia’s lithium mining 
options are currently not being exercised due to these political constraints. Total 
lithium production today would allow about 10% of global vehicle production (60 
million cars) to be equipped with a 9MWh lithium ion battery. Again this would result 
in large market distortions since 1 million hybrid cars equipped with Li ion batteries 
would use as much Li2CO3 as raw lithium is used in the entire electronics sector today 
(Tahil 2007). 
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These two examples of permanent resource crises, in which demand is already 
outpacing the supply, reveal intriguing similarities:  
1. Lithium and rare earth metals are strategic materials needed to implement 
green technologies in order to reduce our dependency on Middle Eastern oil 
production. However, the regional concentration of these strategic resources in 
China and South America respectively presents similar geopolitical risks and 
crisis potential as oil production being predominantly located in the Middle 
East.  
2. Fast emerging and disruptive technologies which need strategic materials will 
have a strong and rapid impact on global materials demand, which will not 
allow for ordered development and growth of the resource supply 
infrastructure. This will lead to financial speculation and short term supply 
problems, which can hamper the implementation of a particular technology 
platform5. 
 
I predict that in the future we will see more of these types of permanent resource 
crises created by a specific technology relying on a particular strategic material 
resource which cannot initially – or ever – be scaled up globally or nationally. Up-
stream analysis in the early stages of technology development must detect such critical 
material requirements, and trigger immediate exploration of possible alternatives 
and/or relevant recycling technologies. By envisioning applications of emerging 
technologies very early in their development - a hallmark of mode-2 knowledge 
production - we have an opportunity to minimize the risk of ‘stranded technologies’ 
and provide cautious input for future projections, as well as reducing expectations to 
realistic levels6. 
3. Recycling of these strategic materials is in its infancy and needs to be 
developed with utmost urgency. While certain materials such as industrial 
catalysts and metals can be recycled in an economically efficient way, many 
highly dematerialized nanotechnology products are multi-phase hybrids 
containing thin films, minute amounts of additives and solvents, and would 
cost prohibitive amounts of energy to recycle. In other words, the smaller the 
                                                           
5 This type of resource crisis is currently being played out around Helium-3. Due to the enormous and 
rapid growth of neutron detectors using Helium-3 – driven by safety and non-proliferation programs of 
the US Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Energy – a severe shortage has 
developed, which has led to a sharp ten-fold price increase over the last 3 years (2006-2009). According 
to the DOE, the short-term demand is about 65.000 liters per year, while the current supply is between 
10.000 to 20.000 liters per year. 1,7% of the Helium-3 is used in medical imaging while 2,5% is 
required for the oil and gas industry. Detectors for neutron scattering (~10%) and security (~84,5%) 
make up the vast majority of Helium-3 demand. New detectors which do not rely on Helium-3 and new 
supply infrastructure projects take time to develop and implement. As mentioned earlier, 
nanotechnology is being touted as a game changer to overcome this (and similar) resource crises. 
Another emerging class of materials shortage reaching crisis level is medical isotopes, in particular 
Technetium-99m. 
6 It needs to be stressed that innovation and technology development calls for a certain level of risk and 
‘irrational exuberance’ in order to mobilize human, financial and other institutional resources. A very 
fine line exists between hype and stagnation created by a risk adverse culture and an ineffective ‘bubble 
culture’, as seen for instance towards the end of the Internet boom. 
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resource concentration becomes within a particular waste stream, the higher 
the energy required to purify it again will be. 
It is thus a daunting task to completely re-engineer and re-design our currently 
unsustainable economies towards even weakly sustainable ones. Incremental tinkering 
will not be enough, and – if achievable at all – this transition will be accompanied by 
major global and local political, social and cultural shifts. Looking at macroeconomic 
trends over time, one can see that technological efficiency and consumer-based 
dematerialization will be able to reduce environmental impact. However, even with 
moderate economic growth rates at or near 2%, and significant technological efficiency 
gains in the order of 50%, one can show that economic growth will in the long run 
always outrun C x T (C = consumer intensity of use, T = technology efficiency factor ) 
(Huesemann 2005). After one or two decades environmental impact will increase again, 
despite all technological efficiency gains. New game-changing technologies will 
subsequently be required to further reduce the environmental impact, which in many 
cases require decades of development and incubation time. The increasing speed of 
technological innovation will create resource calamities, increasing challenges and 
complexities for materials supply and recycling. One could propose that slowing down 
technological innovation and progress might postpone the appearance of future crises, 
which themselves can trigger financial meltdowns and civil unrest. Curbing economic 
growth using monetary policies has mainly been used as a short-term tool to prevent 
‘overheating’ of markets but not with a long-term goal of prolonging the time until the 
next resource limit is reached. In matters of innovation and technological development 
we continuously call on fast-paced and accelerated processes.  
Time scales of innovation and the implementation of emerging technologies are 
important but overlooked parameters. The implementation of technologies reveals time 
constants similar to diffusion time constants of percolation processes and saturation 
levels of market penetration, which have great implications for science and technology 
policies (Ausubel 2004). The implementation of the passenger car as a primary mode 
of transportation, for example, took about 100 years in the United States and leveled 
off at a saturation level near 1000cars/1000 persons. In Canada the development took 
place about 40 years later and required about 60 years to reach a saturation density 
close to 500 cars/1000 people (Figure 2). 
Another important lesson learned when comparing the first with subsequent 
adoptions of a particular technology is that first adopters take significantly longer and 
overshoot in their saturation levels. The longer diffusion time is caused by the need to 
conceive and implement a series of necessary conditions for the technology to be 
implemented. Catching up with technological developments can be done at a 
significantly faster pace, as one has the benefit of knowing about the failures and 
lessons learned by the first adopter and can copy and adapt already proven strategies. 
This should be taken into consideration when exploring the possible ‘re-run’ of 
technologies such as nuclear energy production, biofuels7 and genetically modified 
organisms (GMO), since shorter diffusion times might allow a more realistic timing 
within a complex low-carbon energy production portfolio. Public reaction to the first 
implementation version of the technology has already been tested, and policies as well 
as technological concerns – such as the long term storage and nuclear non-proliferation 
                                                           
7  See the figure representing the global production of primary energy sources between 1960 and 2007 
and Shell’s Blueprint scenario after 2007 in Kramer and Haigh 2009, p. 569. 
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issues – have already been voiced. Thus, as a consequence of earlier public resistance 
and discussion, nuclear 2.0 might propose small subcritical thorium-based pebble-bed 
reactors with local storage and advances in transmutation technologies as a nuclear 
wedge to build a low-carbon based energy supply infrastructure8. GMO 2.0 might 
propose to continue to focus on the local farming of vitamin A and E, zinc and iron 
enhanced cassava plants in Sub-Saharan Africa, from which about 250 million people 
obtain about 40% of their daily caloric requirements. In contrast to GMO 1.0 this 
technology could be implemented with royalty-free licenses and seeds granted by non-
governmental organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to address 
some of the public concerns voiced earlier. 
Timing considerations should be investigated more thoroughly when evaluating 
the use and impact of emerging technologies. The fact that we are now using billions of 
dollars for research and development of technologies in order to remediate the 
confluence of a climate change and multiple sustainability crises begs the question of 
                                                           
8 Thorium (Th) is roughly four times more abundant than uranium, requires no complex enrichment 
process to become a reactor fuel. Th-based reactor waste has radioactivity half life times in the tens of 
years. 232Th is transmutated into 235U by neutron capture, which is a highly efficient nuclear fuel. The 
reason Th was not initially pursued as a reactor fuel was that nowhere in its cycle can fuel or waste be 
converted into nuclear bomb material. 
 
 
Figure 2: Diffusion time and saturation level of passenger car market penetration in various 
countries. Taken from J.H. Ausubel (2004, p. 353). 
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whether science and emerging technologies are not setting themselves up for failure in 
the public’s eye by continuously taking on and rising to this challenge9.  
Kramer and Haigh (2009) argue that the scale of the energy system that needs to be 
revamped is so immense that we need to be aware of physical limits to the rate at which 
new technologies can be implemented. They show that energy technologies go through 
a few decades of exponential growth and incubation until the particular energy source 
becomes part of the energy portfolio by reaching ‘materiality’, at a portion of about 1% 
of the world energy consumption. As shown in Ausubel’s study above it takes time to 
build both industrial and human capacity to reach a materiality level of 1%, after which 
the growth levels off. This time period cannot be shortened by simply increasing the 
financing of a technology. The data in Kramer and Haigh ( 2009) again reiterate that a 
‘re-run’ as shown by the deployment of the second generation of biofuel technology is 
implemented significantly faster than the first generation was. 
The expectation, found in large parts of our societies and amongst political 
establishments in both developed and developing countries, that science will provide 
the ‘magic bullet’ to allow us to continue economic growth and elevate ever larger 
sections of the developing countries to a more affluent life style, without encountering 
global limits of materials resources, energy or ecological constraints, is not sustainable. 
We need to redirect our scientific and technological efforts towards research programs 
with genuine and reasonable deliverables and timetables. Sarewitz’ technology criteria 
are an important consideration in an attempt to maximize the use of scientific efforts 
and money to assist in tackling complex global issues. Dan Sarewitz and Richard 
Nelson (2008) discussed the applicability of technological fixes to a variety of 
technological goals and suggest three rules to assess their usefulness10: 
1. The technological fix must epitomize a strong cause-effect relationship 
connecting the problem to the solution as directly as possible. Vaccines might 
reveal strong cause-effect relationships in laboratory tests which then become 
weakened during socio-technological implementation. Uncertainties are 
reduced when we can address a specific cause-effect relationship rather than 
multiple indirect effects.  
2. One must be able to assess the results of the technological fix using agreed 
metrics which are as unambiguous and uncontroversial as possible. The 
implementation of various economic stimulus policies by the Obama 
administration has already shifted the political discussion onto how to assess 
                                                           
9 The frustration of the American public with the remediation efforts in the current environmental crisis 
in the Gulf of Mexico due to a deep-water oil well leak indicates the dangers of continuously raising the 
technological stakes and coming up short with technological bail outs. 
10 In a 2004 article Sarewitz addressed the question why certain socio-technological problems cannot be 
solved using technology alone. The three examples, climate change, genetically modified organisms 
and foods, and long-term nuclear waste disposal are case studies when science becomes politicized and 
politics becomes ‘scientized’. In these cases uncertainties and heterogeneous disciplinary cultures play 
a major role: in the discussions on global climate change and nuclear waste disposal proposals such as 
proposed and recently abandoned Yucca Mountain site in Nevada the epistemological and ontological 
uncertainties are ideologically politicized in contrasting manner: conservatives demand action in Yucca 
Mountain but oppose action on policies to address global climate change while liberals oppose the 
construction of a nuclear waste disposal site in Yucca Mountain but demand action to reduce CO2 
emissions to reduce impacts on future climate. 
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their impact and which metrics to use (e.g. jobless rate during jobless recovery, 
debt rate, stock market) to gauge their effectiveness. 
3. The fix should address a disciplinarily well-rooted homogeneous 
technological core. 
 
An example given by Sarewitz and Nelson is the approach taken to stabilizing CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere by radically reducing emissions or CO2 removal from 
the atmosphere. While in the first case a plethora of technologies are emerging and 
being assessed (photovoltaic, wind, sequestration) as well as re-assesed (nuclear), the 
implementation of a low-emission economy requires an effective coordination of this 
heterogeneous group of energy producers, suppliers and end users which represents a 
complex energy management portfolio approach with multiple cause-effect 
relationships. While rule (3) can be applied to each individual technology proposed to 
reduce CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere (e.g. photovoltaics, wind, sequestration), 
a strong cause-effect relationship is weakened by the implementation, coordination and 
managerial processes required to succeed. On the other hand, direct removal of CO2 
concentrations from the atmosphere - a technology discussed within the context of 
certain geo-engineering solutions - satisfies all 3 rules suggested by Sarewitz and 
Nelson: a strong cause-effect relationship between CO2 concentrations and global 
temperature exists (Rule 1), standard measurements and metrics exist and are agreed 
upon that measure the CO2 concentrations (Rule 2) and CO2-capture technologies from 
air exist and are currently being developed (Rule 3).  
A second important consideration is to value science and technology efforts based 
on the amount of time they provide for society to transform and evolve towards 
sustainability.  The colloquial ‘it is not if but when’ uncertainty often used in 
discussions on global climate change, materials resource limitations (e.g. ‘peak oil’) or 
global pandemic events suggests that timing is of value in global risk assessments and 
remediation. To have time to implement changes is of significant value since scientific 
resources and strategies can be used more effectively and targeted. The convolution of 
multiple crises (‘The perfect storm’) creates additional non-linear complexities and 
entangled issues which make their solutions even much more difficult and uncertain.  
Climate change – as well as many other global environmental challenges – has 
been framed as a tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). Each individual user (person, 
group, state, global region) of a common resource (atmosphere, ecosphere) in using 
that resource reduces the value of the resource to a smaller degree than the amount of 
utility he derives from it. However, he thereby reduces the value of that resource to all 
other users to a degree greater than the amount of utility he receives for its use. Despite 
their geographical concentrations, material resources such as oil in the Middle East, 
rare earth metals in China, and Lithium in South America can be argued to be common 
global resources, and their depletion can therefore be framed as a tragedy of commons. 
In the absence of enforced or voluntary cooperation, every ‘rational actor’ has thus an 
incentive to deplete the common resource and to do so as fast as possible. 
Slowing down the depletion of commons appears, at least from a neo-liberal 
macroeconomic point of view, to be ‘not rational’ within the context of Mill’s and 
Becker’s ‘Homo Economicus’. Both behavioral economics and decades of research on 
human cooperation and the commons by Elinor Ostrom (Nobel Prize in economics 
2009) have debunked the ‘rational agent’ hypothesis of neoliberal economics and 
replaced it with a more realistic description. Hardin’s concept of the ‘tragedy of 
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commons’ needs to be reinvestigated in light of historical analysis, which indicates that 
in many cases the commons were not overused by ‘rational agents’ but taken over by 
kings and noblemen using the process of enclosure, settlers claiming common land to 
be terra nullius, and today multinational corporations bottling water from public lakes 
and springs, and governmental entities dividing up frequency bands for communication 
purposes11. The development of novel cooperative local political structures which value 
and use commons such as land, lakes, fisheries and forests in new (or not so new) ways 
are still decoupled and uncoordinated from technological developments (e.g. large scale 
CO2 sequestration), despite the fact that they both focus on creating a sustainable 
environment and promote suitable practices. These and other political changes (such as 
global CO2 emission policies) take time to implement. Technologies can provide this 
time by remediating acute problems, increasing technological efficiencies and reducing 
environmental impact. However, these political changes need to be pursued with a 
much longer time horizon than is customary in election cycle-driven politics, and 
continuously coordinated with policies impacting both consumers’ intensity of use (C) 
and the technology factor (T). It might become necessary to sequester some of the 
efficiencies gained by the sustainability levers T and C and reinvest them in financial 
commons. To illustrate this, I will make use of the historical example of Jevons’ 
paradox, sometimes also referred to as the rebound effect. Simply stated it claims that 
any technological progress which increases the efficiency (T) with which a given 
resource is used, tends to also increase the rate of consumption of that particular 
resource. William Stanley Jevons noted in his book ‘The Coal Question’ (1866) that 
the consumption of coal sharply rose with the appearance of the coal-fired steam 
engine built by James Watt, which was more efficient than Thomas Newcomen’s 
design. Improved resource-efficiency tends to lower the cost of a resource and thereby 
increase the demand, which accelerates economic growth, increasing the demand even 
further. In a more detailed analysis one has to examine whether the increase in demand 
outweighs the increased efficiency. Jevons’ paradox will manifest itself when the 
rebound effect is larger than the initial efficiency gains (‘backfire’). Whether this 
occurs or not depends on whether there is an elastic or inelastic demand for the 
resource. In the elastic case, a doubling of the resource efficiency or halving of the 
price more than doubles the amount of resource demand, thus Jevons’ paradoxical 
situation is observed. However, in the inelastic demand situation a doubling of resource 
efficiency or halving of the price does not double the amount of resource demand. In a 
careful analysis many factors besides just resource costs, such as labor intensity and 
infrastructure costs, need to be taken into account. This will decrease the effect of 
resource efficiency and the possibility of the occurrence of a rebound effect. However, 
naïve calculations on the basis of energy efficiency need to be cautiously examined. In 
an established market the direct rebound effect is inelastic and quite small and 
increased resource efficiency tends to reduce resource use. What ultimately outpaces 
resource conservation is economic growth. 
In 1992 Saunders re-examined work by Brookes and Khazzoom and claimed that 
energy efficiencies increase rather than decrease energy consumption. He argues that 
this is due to two processes: first, efficiency reduces energy costs resulting in a higher 
demand (rebound effect), and, second, energy efficiency triggers economic growth 
which increases the demand for energy even more. If this is correct then energy 
                                                           
11 For a historical analysis of the commons see Linebaugh (2008). 
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conservation can only be achieved by coupling an energy efficiency gain with a tax or 
another form of governmental intervention. Wackernagel and Rees (1997) argue along 
these lines and advocate that these efficiency gains need to be removed from further 
economic circulation and reinvested in natural capital rehabilitation. The ordered 
political implementation of mandating the reinvestment of technological efficiency 
gains into financial commons requires decades. This again stresses the common theme 
of this essay that time is needed to evolve our political structures and societies to a 
point where aspects of weak sustainability can be achieved. This is primarily an ethical, 
political, social and cultural struggle, not a technological project.  
It is misguided to use the metaphor of demanding an “Apollo Project for our 
energy future” (R. Smalley), since we did not have to change our societal structures to 
put a man on the moon. The Apollo project and similar industrial war time efforts span 
generally less than a decade and are very difficult to sustain in a civil society with no 
direct external military threat but an ‘intergenerational’ equity issue, which might well 
in the future result in military conflict. It is an important and non-trivial realization that 
emerging technologies can buy societies time to undertake the necessary political, 
social and ethical discussions and changes to address the root-causes of unsustainable 
economies and societies. In a certain way, modern societies are using technologies to 
avoid the necessary political discourse to achieve sustainability. As Allenby put so 
succinctly: “Consumers and society as a whole must not be left with the impression 
that simply relying on technology will avoid the need for difficult and complex 
political decisions. Better technology can buy time, but it cannot by itself buy 
sustainability” (Allenby 1999, p. 57). 
Furthermore, value-based discussions regarding trade-offs between sustainability, 
economic and population growth need to be initiated. If we fail to do this we may 
indeed discover that “…all the technical prowess and manipulative cleverness in the 
world will not solve our problems and, in fact, will make them worse” (Daly 1994, p. 
96).  
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